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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The district court granted Cody Leigh Hansen's motion to suppress the evidence found as
a result of an officer's warrantless search of his vehicle, because Mr. Hansen revoked his consent
to search, which had been previously granted through his probation agreement, and the
warrantless search was not otherwise reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The State

appealed. In arguing the district court erred by granting the motion, the State relies entirely upon
arguments the State did not present to the district court. Because the State did not preserve its
arguments now raised on appeal, Mr. Hansen respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court's order granting his motion to suppress. Even if the State's arguments on appeal
were preserved, this Court should still affirm the order granting Mr. Hansen's motion to
suppress, because the district court's findings of fact do not support the State's justifications for
the warrantless search.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court's findings of fact in its Memorandum Decision and Order
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Sergeant Sproat saw Mr. Hansen's car change lanes without
using a tum signal. (See R., pp.174-75.) Sergeant Sproat stopped the car, and as he approached
the car, he noticed the backset passenger was making "furtive movements," while Mr. Hansen
and the front seat passenger were not wearing seat belts. (R., p.175.) When asked for his license
and registration, Mr. Hansen told the sergeant he was on felony probation, he had not yet
registered the car, and he did not know his home address. (R., p.175.)
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Mr. Hansen's conditions of probation in a separate criminal case included the following
Fourth Amendment waiver:
I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and
other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or for which I am the
controlling authority conducted by any agent of IDOC or a law enforcement
officer. I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho
constitution concerning searches.
(R., p.178.) His probation agreement also included a provision stating he had read, understood,
and accepted the conditions of supervision. (See R., p.178.) Mr. Hansen's probation officer
testified Mr. Hansen had not asked to revoke or modify the conditions of his probation after
signing the probation agreement. (R., p.178.)
During the traffic stop, Sergeant Sproat became susp1c1ous of Mr. Hansen when he
"looked down" and "broke eye contact" with him, after the sergeant asked if there was anything
inside the car he should know about. (R., p.175.) The sergeant asked Mr. Hansen to exit the car,
so he could obtain consent to search Mr. Hansen's car and to "figure out how he's doing on
probation."

(R., p.175.)

Sergeant Sproat and Mr. Hansen had a conversation about

Mr. Hansen's probation, his Fourth Amendment waiver, and when he had been placed on
probation. (See R., p.175.) The district court found, "Sgt. Sproat spoke with Defendant for
approximately fifteen to sixteen minutes regarding his probation status." (R., p.176.)
Per the district court, Sergeant Sproat asked Mr. Hansen "for consent to search the
vehicle more than four times," as seen below:
Q:

So, do you give me consent to search the vehicle?

A:

Uh, I don't really feel comfortable getting searched, but I don't-I thought
you could just search it, you know.

Q:

Well, yeah, I know but-

A:

Yeah, I mean, yeah, but if you have to, yeah.
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(Defendant consents to pat down)
Q:

You're giving me consent to search the vehicle?

A:

Well, like I said I don't feel comfortable but if you have to-

Q:

Like we talked about before, you're on felony probation, okay? Did you
sign anything that says-did you sign a Fourth Amendment waiver?

A:

Yeah. I'm pretty sure, yeah.

(discussing probation packet)
Q:

Yeah. That's why I'm asking for consent, okay?

(following conversation with Defendant about Probation Officer)
Q:

So, you give me consent? I just want to clarify.

A:

Well, I mean I'm not-

Q:

Well that's what we just talked about.

A:

Well, I mean then, no, I don't.

Q:

You don't have to give me consent. But if you sign a Fourth Amendment
waiver-

A:

That is consent.

Q:

What's that?

A:

Then isn't that consent?

Q:

That's not consent, okay? What I'm asking for is consent, based on what
I'm seeing here.

(R., pp.176-77 (quoting Plaintiffs Ex. 2).)
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Sergeant Sproat testified at the motion to suppress hearing "that he initially decided to
search Defendant's vehicle based on Defendant's consent to search and Defendant's Fourth
Amendment waiver signed as a condition of his probation." (R., p.177.) The district court
found, "When Defendant ultimately denied consent to search the vehicle, Sgt. Sproat testified
that he proceeded to search the vehicle based on the consent given pursuant to Defendant's
conditions of probation." (R., p .1 77.)
Because Sergeant Sproat did not have an address for Mr. Hansen, he did not have all the
information he believed was needed to issue Mr. Hansen a citation. (R., p.177 .) Sergeant Sproat
was unable to contact either Mr. Hansen's probation officer or an on-call probation officer to get
Mr. Hansen's address and report his level of cooperation; the sergeant then began to draft a
citation without an address. (See R., p.177.) He "subsequently conducted a warrantless search
of Defendant's vehicle which resulted in the discovery of contraband," and "issued Defendant a
citation for failure to wear a seat belt and arrested him based on the contraband." (R., p.177.)
The State charged Mr. Hansen by Superseding Indictment with possession with intent to
deliver a controlled substance, felony, I.C. § 27-2732(a)(l)(A). (R., pp.28-29.) Later, the State
also charged him by Amended Superseding Indictment with possession of paraphernalia,
misdemeanor, LC. § 37-2734A(l). (R., pp.50-51.)
Mr. Hansen filed a Motion to Suppress, asserting the warrantless stop was unlawful, he
was subject to an unlawful seizure when the sergeant unlawfully prolonged the stop, and he and
his belongings were unlawfully searched without a warrant. (R., pp.55-56.) He asserted the
stop, seizure, and search were in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., p.55.)

4

In his Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, Mr. Hansen asserted the warrantless search
of his car and belongings, was not justified by the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, because there was no probable cause to believe there were controlled substances in
the vehicle. (See R., pp.70-71.) In anticipation of the State's possible response, Mr. Hansen
asserted neither the consent exception nor the special needs exception to the warrant requirement
would justify the search. (See R., pp.71-77.)
On the consent exception, Mr. Hansen asserted, "Even if consent has initially been given
by a citizen, that consent may be revoked or limited at any time." (R., p. 72 ( citing State v.

Eversole, 160 Idaho 239 (2016); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 696-97 (Ct. App. 1999)).) He
further asserted: "In this case, [O]fficer Sproat asked Mr. Hansen if he would consent to a search
of the vehicle. Mr. Hansen told the officer he would not consent to such a search. Because
Mr. Hansen had the right to withdraw any previous consent he may have granted, the search in
this case cannot be justified as a search pursuant to consent." (R., p.72.)
Mr. Hansen asserted the special needs exception did not apply because the search was not
conducted by, or at the request of, a probation officer in furtherance of the special needs of
probation; further, even if the exception applied, Sergeant Sproat did not have reasonable
suspicion to justify the search. (See R., pp.72-77.)
The State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress, arguing Sergeant
Sproat had reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to believe Mr. Hansen's car was being
driven in violation of Idaho Code, and the sergeant did not prolong the stop by abandoning the
original purpose for the stop.

(See R., pp.118-22.)

Turning to the warrantless search of

Mr. Hansen's car, the State argued, "The search of the Defendant's vehicle was conducted
[pursuant] to his previous, voluntarily given, consent." (R., p.122 ( emphasis omitted).)

5

The State believed "that the question of whether or not a probationer may deny or revoke
consent is a matter of first impression in Idaho." (R., p.123.) The State contended the Idaho
Court of Appeals' logic in State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584 (Ct. App. 2013), "is valuable in
answering this question." (R., p.123.) The State characterized Ellis as holding "that a parolee
may not unilaterally suspend his parole agreement by committing a wrongful act because to do
so would allow the parolee to be able to commit further parole violations with impunity," and
"'applicable terms and conditions of[] parole, such as [a] Fourth Amendment waiver, remain[]
operative until revoked through a due process hearing."' (R., p.123 (quoting Ellis, 155 Idaho at
589-90)).
The State then argued that the district court "should find that Fourth Amendment waivers
pursuant to probation agreements should be treated the same as those found within parole
agreements. This Court should not allow the Defendant to revoke his previously given consent
on the side of the road, unilaterally, and in a setting other than in a formal due process hearing."
(R., p.123.) The State did not argue that the special needs exception justified the warrantless
search of Mr. Hansen's car, nor did the State argue that any other exception to the warrant
requirement justified the search. (See R., pp.122-23.)
The district court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress, where Sergeant Sproat
testified.

(R., pp.125-37.

See generally Tr., pp.15-79.)

Regarding the warrantless search,

Mr. Hansen asserted, "It looks like the State has focused their argument on one justification for
the warrantless search, which was consent, so I'll address that." (Tr., p.87, L.23 - p.88, L.1.) He
asserted, "there's no dispute that Mr. Hansen withdrew consent to a search, told the officer that
he would not consent to a search of the vehicle." (Tr., p.88, Ls.2-4.) He asserted that "the
general rule on consent applies in any context"; while anyone was free to consent to a search and
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seizure, anyone was also free to revoke that previously-given consent. (Tr., p.89, L.22 - p.90,
L.1.) Mr. Hansen also asserted the State was arguing for irrevocable consent in the probation
context, but there was no case law to support that and, after Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141
(2013), Idaho had abandoned the idea of irrevocable consent in the DUI context. (See Tr., p.90,
L.2 -p.94, L.15.)
On the special needs exception, Mr. Hansen discussed Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868
(1987), State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227 (Ct. App. 1983), and State v. Vega, 110 Idaho 685 (Ct.
App. 1986). (See Tr., p.95, L.10 - p.97, L.1.) He quoted Pinson for the proposition that "a
probation officer may make a warrantless search of a probationer 'if he has reasonable grounds
to believe the probationer has violated conditions and the search is reasonably related to that
disclosure."' (Tr., p.96, Ls.2-6.) He further asserted that, if the district court agreed with the
State's arguments on the Fourth Amendment waiver and consent to search, thrn the court should
find the Fourth Amendment waiver is unconstitutional. (See Tr., p.99, L.18 -p.100, L.5.)
The district court told the State that it thought there was reasonable suspicion to stop
Mr. Hansen, and asked the State to move into consent.

(See Tr., p.104, Ls.16-19.)

The

prosecutor then argued, "consent had already been given even if it wasn't given directly to
Sergeant Sproat. . . . What this case is really about, Your Honor, is giving teeth to Fourth
Amendment waivers by probationers." (Tr., p.106, L.21 - p.107, L.1.) The State mentioned that
some Fourth Amendment waivers included words allowing for searches "at the request of the
probation officer." (See Tr., p.106, Ls.4-21 (citing State v. Jaskowski, 163 Idaho 257 (2018);
State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745 (Ct. App. 2011)).) The State argued that waivers like the one at

issue here, which did not include "at the request of the probation officer" language, were, "For
lack of a better term ... absolute waivers." (Tr., p.108, Ls.4-17 .)
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The prosecutor then argued:

"The issue, Your Honor, is when can that consent be

revoked? And I think this is a new issue for Idaho." (Tr., p.108, Ls.18-19.) The State repeated
its argument, based on Ellis, that a probationer's Fourth Amendment waiver consenting to
searches should not be able to revoked ''unilaterally," "on the side of the road," and "outside of a
due process hearing." (See Tr., p.109, L.6-p.110, L.19.)
When the district court asked if there needed to be some reasonable grounds for the
search, even if consent to search were irrevocable absent a due process hearing, the prosecutor
responded that Mr. Hansen "misunderstands the Pinson case grossly." (See Tr., p.110, L.22 p.111, L.10.) The State argued the probationer in Pinson had not consented to searches as a
condition of his probation. (Tr., p.111, Ls.12-14.) Next, the prosecutor told the district court:
"And as the courts have made it clear, Your Honor, if the probationer or parolee has entered into
a probation or parole agreement that includes a consent to warrantless searches, then the threeprong test, the reasonable grounds test developed in Vega and Pinson, does not apply.... I can
cite [those cases] if the Court wants." (Tr., p.111, Ls.18-24.)
The prosecutor then cited the following cases: State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841 (1987);
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001);
State v. Fuller, 138 Idaho 60 (2002); State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728 (2002); State v. Buhler, 137

Idaho 685 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Misner, 135 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. De Vore, 134
Idaho 344 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359 (Ct. App. 1998); and State v. Peters,
130 Idaho 960 (Ct. App. 1997). (Tr., p.112, Ls.2-23.) The prosecutor informed the district
court, "I haven't read all those cases .... " (Tr., p.112, L.24.) Nevertheless, the prosecutor
contended those cases implicitly or expressly supported the State's argument that, if a
probationer or parolee entered into a probation or parole agreement that included a consent to
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warrantless searches, there did not need to be reasonable grounds for a search. (See Tr., p.112,
L.25 -p.113, L.11.)
The prosecutor argued that Mr. Hansen had agreed to such a Fourth Amendment waiver,
and he could not unilaterally revoke it. (See Tr., p.113, Ls.12-19.) The State reiterated, based on
the "logic in Ellis, that applicable terms and conditions of parole, and I add 'or probation,' such
as the Fourth Amendment waiver, remain operative until revoked through a due process
hearing." (Tr., p.114, Ls.5-9.)
In rebuttal, Mr. Hansen asserted Turek and Ellis were not on point, because there was no
revocation of consent in those cases. (See Tr., p.114, L.23 - p.116, L.8.) He further asserted that
the State had "no authority to cite to support their argument that consent is irrevocable in the
probation context or any other context." (Tr., p.116, L.25 - p.117, L.3.)
Additionally, Mr. Hansen asserted Samson was not on point because that case dealt with
a specific statute providing that parolees agreed to suspicionless searches, and the United States
Supreme Court stated that parolees had a lesser expectation of privacy than probationers. (See
Tr., p.117, L.12-p.118, L.3.) As for Knights, Mr. Hansen asserted that case was likewise not on
point, because the State was "arguing consent in this case," and the United States Supreme Court
in Knights held it did not need to decide whether the probationer's acceptance of a search
condition constituted consent in the sense of a complete Fourth Amendment waiver, because the
search was reasonable under the Court's "general Fourth Amendment approach."

(See

Tr., p.118, Ls.4-8.) He asserted Knights and Samson did "not support what the State argues for,"
because "[t]hose cases were not about a defendant's consent." (Tr., p.118, Ls.14-16.)
In a brief surrebuttal, the prosecutor argued, "The Court can focus on even the Pecor
case, the Peters case, and the Gawron case," for the proposition that a search done under a
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probationer’s or parolee’s consent to warrantless searches did not require reasonable grounds.
(See Tr., p.120, Ls.14-25.) Mr. Hansen subsequently filed a Reply Brief, asserting, with respect
to the warrantless search, “The State has only argued and raised the issue that the search in this
case was justified by consent.” (R., p.139.)
The district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress. (R., pp.174-88.) The court decided the initial stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion. (See R., pp.180-82.) However, the district court granted Mr. Hansen’s motion to
suppress, “because Defendant revoked his consent to search and the warrantless search was not
otherwise reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (R., p.174.)
The district court ruled that Sergeant Sproat could not rely on Mr. Hansen’s Fourth
Amendment waiver, after Mr. Hansen revoked his consent to search. (R., p.182.) The court
observed, “consent once given may also be revoked for inherent in the requirement that consent
be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that consent.” (R., p.184 (quoting State v.
Greub, 162 Idaho 581, 586 (Ct. App. 2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted).) “Thus, after a
defendant has revoked consent, officers no longer may act pursuant to that initial voluntary
consent.” (R., p.184 (quoting Greub, 162 Idaho at 586) (internal quotation marks omitted).)
The district court found, “the State has cited to no authority that indicates the consent
provided by Defendant as a condition of his probation could not later be revoked.” (R., p.185.)
Moreover, the court found: “The evidence in the record shows that Defendant ultimately did not
give consent for Sgt. Sproat to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle. Following the
reasoning in Greub, it was not reasonable for Sgt. Sproat to rely on Defendant’s advance consent
given pursuant to a waiver when Defendant subsequently revoked his consent to search the
vehicle.” (R., p.185.) Next, the district court distinguished this case from Gawron, “because
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Defendant was present during the search and he expressly revoked his consent to search.”
(R., p.185.)

Additionally, the court found that “the State has pointed to no authority that

indicates that consent to search given under a Fourth Amendment waiver is irrevocable.”
(R., p.186.)
The district court also ruled that “the State’s argument that a probationer cannot revoke
consent to search absent a court hearing is unavailing in this case.” (R., p.186.) The State’s
reading of Ellis was “broad,” and the court ruled that “Ellis is not applicable to the facts of this
case.” (See R., p.186.) The district court ruled that, unlike in Ellis, Mr. Hansen “was not
arrested at the time Sgt. Sproat conducted a search of his vehicle,” and at the time of the stop,
“there was no evidence that Defendant had committed a probation violation.” (R., p.187.)
Further, Mr. Hansen “did not raise the argument that he was no longer subject to the terms of his
probation agreement once he was stopped by Sgt. Sproat.” (R., p.187.) The court then ruled that
“Sgt. Sproat did not possess reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal
activity which would justify the search of a probationer under Ellis. In fact, the only reason
given by Sgt. Sproat for the search of the vehicle was Defendant’s status as a probationer and his
consent to search and Fourth Amendment waiver given as a condition of probation.” (R., p.187.)
The district court ruled that Sergeant Sproat’s search of Mr. Hansen’s car did not fall
within any other exception to the warrant requirement. (R., p.187.) According to the district
court: “In the present case, the State presented no evidence that Sgt. Sproat’s warrantless search
of Defendant’s vehicle fell within another exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the
evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the vehicle warrants suppression.”
(R., p.187.) The district court did not reach Mr. Hansen’s arguments on the prolonging of the
stop or the constitutionality of the terms of his probation. (See R., p.187.)
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The State filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Memorandum Decision and Order on
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.189-92.)
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ISSUE
The State frames the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by granting Hansen's motion to suppress?
Mr. Hansen rephrases the issue as:
Did the district court properly grant Mr. Hansen's motion to suppress when, for the first
time on appeal, the State offers unpreserved, yet still inapplicable, arguments on why an
exception to the warrant requirement allows the admission of evidence from the
illegal search?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Granted Mr. Hansen's Motion To Suppress When, For The First
Time On Appeal, The State Offers Unpreserved, Yet Still Inapplicable, Arguments On Why An
Exception To The Warrant Requirement Allows The Admission Of Evidence From The
Illegal Search

A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, the State argues the district court erred by granting

Mr. Hansen's motion to suppress because, under a general Fourth Amendment approach,
Sergeant Sproat's search of Mr. Hansen's car was reasonable. (See App. Br., pp.4-14.) The
State did not argue this general Fourth Amendment approach before the district court. Rather,
the State only argued, under the consent exception to the warrant requirement, that Mr. Hansen
could not revoke his consent to search under his Fourth Amendment waiver absent a formal due
process hearing.

The State cannot present its new general Fourth Amendment approach

argument for the first time on appeal. Thus, this Court should affirm the district court's order
granting the motion to suppress.
Even if the State's argument is preserved, the general Fourth Amendment approach
would not apply to justify the search of Mr. Hansen's car. Under the facts found by the district
court, the sergeant did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to support the search. Thus, if
the general Fourth Amendment approach argument were considered, this Court should still
affirm the district court's decision.
The State also argues in the alternative, for the first time on appeal, that even if
Mr. Hansen could have effectively withdrawn his consent and Fourth Amendment waiver, he did
not unequivocally do so. (See App. Br., pp.14-17.) The State did not take this position on the
consent exception before the district court. The State instead only argued that Mr. Hansen could
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not revoke his consent without a formal due process hearing. This Court should therefore affirm
the district court's order granting the motion to suppress, because the State has impermissibly
shifted positions and cannot present its new no unequivocal withdrawal of consent argument on
appeal.

Further, even if the State's no unequivocal withdrawal of consent argument were

preserved, the State has failed to show the district court's factual findings that Mr. Hansen
revoked his consent are clearly erroneous.

Thus, this Court should still affirm the district

court's decision.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Moore, 164

Idaho 379, 381 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court has held,
"When we review an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's
factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

The appellate court "freely reviews the application of

constitutional principles to the facts as found." Moore, 164 Idaho at 381 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

C.

This Court Should Affirm The District Court's Order Granting Mr. Hansen's Motion To
Suppress, Because The State's Arguments Are Neither Preserved Nor Applicable
Mr. Hansen asserts this Court should decline to consider the State's arguments on

appeal-the general Fourth Amendment approach and unequivocal consent arguments-because
the State did not present those arguments before the district court. Even if this Court were to
consider the State's arguments on appeal, the facts found by the district court do not show
Sergeant Sproat had the requisite reasonable suspicion to support the search under the general
Fourth Amendment approach, and the State has failed to show the court's factual findings that
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Mr. Hansen revoked his consent are clearly erroneous. Thus, the State has shown no error in the
district court's decision to grant Mr. Hansen's motion to suppress.

1.

The General Fourth Amendment Approach Argument Is Not Preserved And Thus
Cannot Be Raised On Appeal, Because The State Never Argued Before The
District Court That The Search Was Reasonable Under That Exception

The State never presented its general Fourth Amendment approach argument before the
district court. Thus, under Idaho's long-standing precedent barring new arguments on appeal,
this Court should decline to address the State's general Fourth Amendment approach argument.

a.

The State Did Not Present A General Fourth Amendment Approach
Argument Before The District Court

The State did not present a general Fourth Amendment approach argument before the
district court.

Rather, the State only argued, under the consent exception to the warrant

requirement, that Mr. Hansen could not revoke his previously-granted consent to search absent a
formal due process hearing. (See R., pp.122-23; Tr., p.106, L.7 -p.114, L.11.)
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated. 1 U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures
are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). To
overcome this presumption, the search must fall within a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. Id. at 455. When a defendant challenges a warrantless search, the State

1

Mr. Hansen also asserted the search of his car was unlawful under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. (See R., p.55.) However, he did not specifically articulate before the district court
why the Idaho Constitution would be more protective than the Fourth Amendment in
this context.
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bears the burden to show that a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is
applicable. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970).
Consent is one such well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). As the United States Supreme Court has
held, the State has the burden of showing that the consent “was in fact, freely and voluntarily
given.” Id. at 222 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The question of whether a consent to a
search was in fact ‘voluntary’ . . . is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.” Id. at 227.
When a search is authorized by consent, “the scope of the search is limited by the terms
of its authorization.” Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980). “The standard for
measuring the scope of a suspects’ consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’
reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). Further, the
Idaho Supreme Court has recently held, “Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is
the right of the person to withdraw that consent.” State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646 (2014).
The State exclusively argued before the district court that the search of Mr. Hansen’s car
was justified by his consent to search under his Fourth Amendment waiver. The State argued in
its memorandum, “The search of the Defendant’s vehicle was conducted [pursuant] to his
previous, voluntarily given, consent.” (R., p.122.) The State also contended the district court
“should not allow the Defendant to revoke his previously given consent on the side of the road,
unilaterally, and in a setting other than in a formal due process hearing.” (R., p.123.)
During the motion to suppress hearing, the State likewise argued Mr. Hansen had
consented to searches and could not revoke his consent absent a formal due process hearing.
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(See Tr., p.106, L.7 – p.114, L.11.) The prosecutor argued, “The issue, the true issue, Your
Honor, is when can a person revoke that previously given consent?” (Tr., p.110, Ls.8-9.)
The district court rejected the State’s consent argument when it granted the motion to
suppress, ruling Mr. Hansen had revoked his consent. (R., pp.182-87.) Its consent argument
having failed before the district court, the State now proffers a new theory on appeal—that the
evidence from the search should not be suppressed under a general Fourth Amendment approach.
(See App. Br., pp.4-14.)
In United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), the United States Supreme Court held
the search of a probationer’s residence, when he was subject to a condition of his probation
consenting to searches, “was reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach of
‘examining the totality of the circumstances,’ with the probation search condition being a salient
circumstance.” Id. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). The Knights
Court balanced the probationer’s diminished expectation of privacy against the governmental
interests in supervising those on probation, and held “that the balance of these considerations
requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s house.” Id.
at 119-21. Later, under the general Fourth Amendment approach, the United States Supreme
Court held the suspicionless search of a parolee did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
On appeal here, the State argues: “[T]he district court erred by failing to analyze the
issue with respect to [Mr.] Hansen’s reduced expectation of privacy as a probationer.
Specifically, the state asserts that under a traditional Fourth Amendment analysis,
[Mr.] Hansen’s reduced expectation of privacy balanced against the state’s legitimate interest in
supervising probationers rendered Sgt. Sproat’s search of the vehicle reasonable under the Fourth
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Amendment." (App. Br., p.4.) The State contends that, "despite recognizing [Mr.] Hansen's
reduced expectation of privacy," the district court "did not analyze the Fourth Amendment issue
presented through the lens of this reduced privacy expectation." (App. Br., p.6.) According to
the State, "As in Knights and Samson, a balancing between the state's legitimate interest in
supervising probationers and [Mr.] Hansen's reduced expectation of privacy resulting from his
status as a probationer and the broad terms of his probation agreement justified Sgt. Sproat's
search under a traditional Fourth Amendment analysis of the reasonableness of the search."
(App. Br., p.13.)
However, the State did not present this argument before the district court. In fact, after
rejecting the State's consent argument, the court ruled that "the State presented no evidence that
Sgt. Sproat's warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle fell within another exception to the
warrant requirement.'' (R., p.18 7.)

b.

Unpreserved Issues Cannot Be Raised For The First Time On Appeal

The State's general Fourth Amendment approach argument is not preserved, and thus
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that,
"Although 'this Court is not limited by the prosecutor's argument or the absence thereof ...
[i]ssues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be
held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court."' State v. Wolfe, 445
P.3d 147, 150-51 (Idaho 2019) (quoting State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017)).
The Wolfe Court emphasized, "This is not a new approach." Id. at 150. In territorial
days, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho held, "It is manifestly unfair for a party to go
into court and slumber, as it were, on his defense, take no exception to the ruling, present no
point for the attention of the court, and seek to present his defense, that was never mooted before,
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to the judgment of the appellate court.” Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867). “Such a
practice would destroy the purpose of an appeal and make the supreme court one for deciding
questions of law in the first instance.” Id.
One hundred and fifty years later, in State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271 (2017),
the Idaho Supreme Court underscored, “We have long held that ‘[a]ppellate court review is
limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.’” Id. at 275 (quoting
Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714 (2007)). The Garcia-Rodriguez Court also held the
requirement of issue preservation “applies equally to all parties on appeal.” Id. at 276.
Under the long-standing requirement of issue preservation, the State did not preserve its
general Fourth Amendment approach argument now proffered on appeal. The State only argued
before the district court that the evidence from the search should not be suppressed under the
consent exception to the warrant requirement. (See R., pp.122-23; Tr., p.106, L.7 – p.114, L.11.)
The argument that Mr. Hansen could not revoke his consent without a formal due process
hearing did not preserve a general Fourth Amendment approach argument for appeal. This is
because the consent exception to the warrant requirement is separate from the general Fourth
Amendment approach. The exceptions to the warrant requirement are “specifically established
and well delineated.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455. “The exceptions are jealously and carefully
drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption that the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has been careful not to muddle the consent exception
and the general Fourth Amendment approach. For example, in Knights the Court held, “We need
not decide whether Knights’ acceptance of the search condition constituted consent in the
Schneckloth sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights, however, because we
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conclude that the search of Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment
approach of ‘examining the totality of the circumstances’ . . . .” Knights, 534 U.S. at 118. The
Knights Court further explained, “We do not decide whether the probation condition so
diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy (or constituted
consent) that a search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would
have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”

Id. at 120 n.6.

Similarly, the Samson Court found “that the search at issue here is reasonable under our general
Fourth Amendment approach,” and “decline[d] to rest our holding today on the consent
rationale.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 842 n.3. Because the consent exception and the general Fourth
Amendment approach are separate, the State’s argument before the district court on consent did
not preserve a general Fourth Amendment approach argument.
Perhaps in anticipation of its problems with preservation, the State argues that “[t]his
issue is . . . preserved,” because, “[w]hile the state has expanded upon the argument it set forth
below, the state cited Knights and Samson to the district court, and argued [Mr.] Hansen had a
reduced expectation of privacy as a probationer and that his attempts to withdraw his probation
consent did not preclude Sgt. Sproat’s search.” (App. Br., p.14 n.2.) This is inaccurate.
The State really cited Knights and Samson to the district court as part of a list of cases it
provided in favor of the State’s consent argument; namely, to support the proposition that if a
probationer or parolee consented to search, there did not need to be reasonable grounds for a
search. (See Tr., p.111, L.18 – p.113, L.11.) Further, the prosecutor told the court, “Your
Honor, I haven’t read all those cases . . . .” (Tr., p.112, L.24.) Considering the prosecutor in the
district court may not have even read Knights and Samson, the State cannot now argue on appeal
it was advancing a general Fourth Amendment approach argument by citing those cases.

21

Moreover, the State argued before the district court that a probationer’s reduced
expectation of privacy was relevant to the question of whether a probationer could revoke
consent. Specifically, the prosecutor acknowledged that “most people when they give consent
can revoke consent,” but contended that “probationers are a little different from your average
citizen. It’s kind of a weird way the court’s always saying it, but they enjoy a lesser expectation
of privacy. . . . It’s a diminished expectation of privacy.” (Tr., p.108, L.24 – p.109, L.5.) The
State then argued that consent to search under a probationer’s Fourth Amendment waiver could
not be revoked absent a formal due process hearing. (See Tr., p.109, Ls.6-18.)
Additionally, the State contends that Mr. Hansen “argued that Knights and Samson were
inapplicable for the present case for several reasons including that [Mr.] Hansen, unlike Samson,
was a probationer rather than a parolee.” (App. Br., p.14 n.2.) This is also not entirely accurate.
During the motion to suppress hearing, Mr. Hansen asserted Knights and Samson were not on
point because Samson was a parolee, but also because “the State is arguing consent in this case.”
(See Tr., p.117, L.12 – p.118, L.5.) Mr. Hansen asserted Knights and Samson “do not support
what the State argues for,” because “[t]hose cases were not about a defendant’s consent.”
(Tr., p.118, Ls.14-16.) Mr. Hansen also explained that in those cases, the United States Supreme
Court “applied the general needs exception, general Fourth Amendment analysis, and again said
we find these to be reasonable. In neither of those cases did the Supreme Court say, oh, yeah,
there was consent, the defendant consented to these searches; therefore, we’re upholding of
them.” (Tr., p.118, Ls.21-25.)
The State suggests that its general Fourth Amendment approach argument is preserved
for appeal because the “issue was argued to, or decided by, the district court . . . .” (See App.
Br., p.14 n.2 (quoting State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 868 (2018)).) But as demonstrated above,
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the State did not present a general Fourth Amendment approach argument before the district
court. Nor did the court decide the matter based on a general Fourth Amendment approach.
After rejecting the State’s consent argument, the district court ruled that “the State presented no
evidence that Sgt. Sproat’s warrantless search of Defendant’s vehicle fell within another
exception to the warrant requirement.” (R., p.187.) Put otherwise, the court made no findings or
conclusions relating to the general Fourth Amendment approach. Cf. Wolfe, 445 P.3d at 152
(holding the State did not preserve an independent source exception, as evidenced by the district
court not making any findings or conclusions related to that exception).
To the extent the State contends that the general Fourth Amendment approach argument
is preserved for appeal because the prosecutor simply cited Knights and Samson, that theory has
been rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. (See App. Br., p.14 n.2.) In Wolfe, the Court held,
“simply stating the name of a case and a general proposition therefrom is not enough to raise
every specific theory or principle of law within it.” Wolfe, 445 P.3d at 151. The Wolfe Court
also held, “Allowing the State to merely cite a case without arguing the proper legal theory
applicable to the issue would effectively nullify the State’s burden to prove application of an
identified exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. The Court observed, “Such a ‘kitchen sink’
strategy will not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal and is inherently unfair to the defense.”
Id. Here, the prosecutor citing Knights and Samson, possibly without even having read those
cases, did not preserve the general Fourth Amendment approach argument for appeal.
In sum, the State did not present the general Fourth Amendment approach argument
before the district court. The State had the burden of showing an exception to the warrant
requirement justified the search of Mr. Hansen’s car. See Vale, 399 U.S. at 34. Because the State
did not present the general Fourth Amendment approach argument to the district court,
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Mr. Hansen did not have the opportunity to respond to that argument, and the district court was
unable to make relevant factual findings. For the first time on appeal, the State asks this Court to
decide whether the general Fourth Amendment approach applies to justify the search, without the
benefit of the State's argument before the district court, the presentation of pertinent evidence,
Mr. Hansen's response, and findings of fact or legal analysis by the district court.
This Court should decline to address the State's general Fourth Amendment approach
argument for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Wolfe, 445 P.3d at 151-52. Thus, Mr. Hansen
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order granting his motion
to suppress.

2.

Even If Preserved, The General Fourth Amendment Approach Does Not Apply
To Justify The Search Because, Under The Facts Found By The District Court,
Sergeant Sproat Did Not Have The Requisite Reasonable Suspicion To Support
The Search

Even if the State preserved the argument, the general Fourth Amendment approach does
not apply to justify the search of Mr. Hansen's car because, under the facts found by the district
court, Sergeant Sproat did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to support the search.
In Knights, the United States Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of the
probationer, "supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Knights, 534 U.S. at 122. The
Knights Court held that the balance of the probationer's diminished expectation of privacy with
the governmental interests in supervising probationers "requires no more than reasonable
suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer's house." See id. at 121. The Court held,
"When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is
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engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an
intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.” Id.
Under the facts found by the district court, Sergeant Sproat did not have this requisite
reasonable suspicion to support the search of Mr. Hansen’s car. The court found that “Sgt.
Sproat became suspicious of Defendant when Defendant ‘looked down’ and ‘broke eye contact’
with him after Sgt. Sproat asked Defendant if there was anything inside the vehicle he should
know about.” (R., p.175.) The district court did not make factual findings that would support a
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hansen was engaged in criminal activity. (See R., pp.175-78.)
Indeed, the court ruled, “Sgt. Sproat did not possess reasonable suspicion that Defendant was
engaged in criminal activity which would justify the search of a probationer under Ellis.”
(R., p.187.)
The State does not attempt to argue that Sergeant Sproat had reasonable suspicion to
justify a search. (See App. Br., pp.6-14.) The State instead argues for an extension of Samson,
contending the suspicionless search of a probationer subject to a search condition does not
violate the Fourth Amendment. (See App. Br., pp.10-13.) Specifically, the State argues, “there
is no distinction between the rights of parolees and probationers for the purpose of applying the
Fourth Amendment in the circumstances of this case and therefore, Sgt. Sproat’s search was
lawful under the traditional Fourth Amendment standard utilized in Samson.” (App. Br., p.10.)
The State’s argument that a suspicionless search of a probationer subject to a search
condition does not violate the Fourth Amendment fails for several reasons. Importantly, the
United States Supreme Court has distinguished parolees and probationers for purposes of
applying the Fourth Amendment. The Knights Court stated probation is one point on a
continuum of possible punishments. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
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U.S. 868, 874 (1987)).

Later, in Samson, the Court explained that “parolees are on the

‘continuum’ of state-imposed punishments,” and “[on] this continuum, parolees have fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than
probation is to imprisonment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 850.
The State quotes State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 230 n.1 (Ct. App. 1983), in support of
the proposition that “there appears to be no particular history in Idaho of courts treating
probationers and parolees differently in Fourth Amendment contexts.” (App. Br., p.10.) But
after Pinson, the United States Supreme Court recognized a distinction between probationers and
parolees for purposes of applying the Fourth Amendment. Further, in a case cited by the State
(see App. Br., p.11), the Ninth Circuit held that its prior cases, “to the extent they hold that ‘there
is no constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth
amendment.’ . . .

conflict with the Supreme Court’s holding that ‘parolees have fewer

expectations of privacy than probationers.’” United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam) (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 850; Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1083 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2005)).)
The State also argues that, “The difference in expectation of privacy between a felony
probationer and a felony parolee is insignificant compared to the difference in expectation of
privacy between a felony parolee and an unsupervised misdemeanor probationer.”

(App.

Br., p.11.) The State thereby again ignores Samson, where the Court held that “parolees have
fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment
than probation is to imprisonment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 850. The Samson Court also favorably
quoted a First Circuit case holding, “[On] the Court’s continuum of possible punishments, parole
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is the stronger medicine; ergo, parolees enjoy even less of the average citizen’s absolute liberty
than do probationers.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Next, the State argues, “If a felony probationer has the right to revoke the waiver and
consent granted by his probation agreement, the constitutional protection afforded him would be
as broad as that afforded all other persons under the Fourth Amendment—despite his reduced
expectation of privacy.”

(App. Br., p.12.)

This proposition muddles the general Fourth

Amendment approach and the consent exception, which the United States Supreme Court was
careful to avoid doing in Knights and Samson. The exceptions to the warrant requirement,
contrary to the State’s attempt to mix them here, are “well delineated” and “jealously and
carefully drawn.” See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455.
Moreover, the cases cited by the State do not actually support the above proposition.
(See App. Br., p.12.) The holding in People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1971), disapproved of
for other reasons by People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975), on how the purposes of probation
would be frustrated if the only remedy for refusing consent to search would be a probation
revocation, does not speak to the breadth of a probationer’s constitutional protections. See id. at
634. Further, in United States v. Doxey, 833 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2016), the defendant was a
parolee, not a probationer like Mr. Hansen. See id. at 704 n.1. The State also neglected to
mention that the defendant in Doxey had preservation problems much like those of the State
here: the defendant “never argued before the district court, as he does now on appeal, that he
withdrew his consent to be searched and, therefore, waived this argument.” See id.
Additionally, the State contends, “the Fourth Amendment does not preclude a probation
search where the probationer refuses the law enforcement officer’s request to search, as
[Mr.] Hansen did in this case.” (App. Br., pp.12-13.) For that point, the State relies upon

27

State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745 (Ct. App. 2011). The Turek Court noted that most courts that had
addressed whether a probationer may refuse a request to search pursuant to a probation condition
concluded “that a condition which requires a probationer to ‘submit’ to a search permits
warrantless searches by probation officers regardless of whether the probationer actually
consents to the search.” Id. at 749 n.3 (citing cases). However, Turek and the cases cited therein
predate Halseth, where the Idaho Supreme Court held: “Consent to a search must be voluntary.
Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that
consent.” Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646 (citation omitted). The State has not pointed to any cases
from the Idaho Supreme Court, or the United States Supreme Court, holding that probationers
fall within an exception to the general rule that a person may withdraw consent.
In sum, even if preserved, the State’s general Fourth Amendment approach argument
does not apply to justify the search of Mr. Hansen’s car, because Sergeant Sproat did not have
the requisite reasonable suspicion to support the search. Under Knights, an officer may search a
probationer, regardless of consent, provided the probationer is subject to a search condition and
the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the probationer is engaged in criminal activity.
See Knights, 534 U.S. at 122. But the State does not argue that Sergeant Sproat had that requisite
reasonable suspicion here. The State’s argument that Samson should be extended to allow
suspicionless searches of probationers is unavailing.

Thus, the search of Mr. Hansen’s car

remains unlawful, and the district court properly granted his motion to suppress.
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3.

The Alternative Argument That Mr. Hansen Did Not Unequivocally Revoke His
Consent Is Not Preserved And Thus Cannot Be Raised On Appeal, Because The
State Never Took That Position Before The District Court

In the alternative, the State argues, for the first time on appeal, that even if Mr. Hansen
could have effectively withdrawn his consent, he did not unequivocally do so.

(See App.

Br., pp.14-17.) The State never took that position on the consent exception before the district
court. Thus, under Idaho's long-standing precedent barring new arguments on appeal, this Court
should decline to address the State's no unequivocal revocation of consent argument.

a.

The State Never Took The Position That Mr. Hansen, Even If He Could
Have Effectively Withdrawn His Consent, Did Not Unequivocally Do So,
Before The District Court

The State never took the position that Mr. Hansen, even if he could have effectively
withdrawn his consent, did not unequivocally do so, before the district court. As discussed
above, the State argued before the district court that Mr. Hansen had consented to search through
his Fourth Amendment waiver, and he could not revoke his consent absent a formal due process
hearing. (See R., pp.122-23; Tr., p.106, L.7 - p.114, L.11.) The district court rejected that
argument, ruling Mr. Hansen had revoked his consent. (R., pp.182-87.)
Instead of making the consent argument rejected by the district court on appeal, the State
now argues, in the alternative, a new position on the consent exception-that "even if
[Mr.] Hansen could have effectively withdrawn the consent and Fourth Amendment waiver
associated with his probation agreement, a review of the facts of this case demonstrates that
[Mr.] Hansen did not unequivocally do so." (App. Br., p.14.) The State contends Mr. Hansen
"did not unequivocally withdraw his consent and Fourth Amendment waiver in the course of the
traffic stop." (App. Br., p.15.)
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b.

New Positions Are Unpreserved And Cannot Be Raised For The First
Time On Appeal

The State's new position that Mr. Hansen did not unequivocally revoke his probation is
not preserved. The State's consent argument before the district court was that Mr. Hansen could
not revoke his consent without a formal due process hearing. By abandoning that argument in
favor of the no unequivocal revocation argument, the State has impermissibly shifted its position
on appeal.
As part of the body of long-standing precedent on issue preservation, the Idaho Supreme
Court has explained that "both the issue and the party's position on the issue must be raised
before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal." State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,
439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). For example, in Garcia-Rodriguez, the Court declined "to adopt a
'wrong result-wrong theory' approach to reverse a lower court's decision based on issues neither
raised nor argued below." 162 Idaho at 276. The State in Garcia-Rodriguez had argued before
the district court that an officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for misdemeanor
driving without a license, pursuant to LC. §§ 49-301 and 49-1407. See id. at 274-75. The
district court ruled the officer did not have reasonable grounds to arrest the defendant under
section 49-1407, and granted the defendant's motion to suppress. See id. at 274. The State then
argued, for the first time on appeal, that once the officer developed probable cause to believe the
defendant had no driver's license in violation of section 49-301, the arrest was constitutionally
justified, regardless of section 49-1407's limits on certain misdemeanor arrests. Id. at 274-75.
The Garcia-Rodriguez Court held that, even though the State's new argument on appeal
was likely correct, "the State failed to advance this argument below, and it is not properly before
this Court on appeal." Id. at 275. The Court highlighted that, in the proceedings before the
district court, "The State's current argument that Idaho Code section 49-1407 is immaterial to the
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question of the constitutionality of the arrest is nowhere to be found.” Id. The Court held,
“Because the constitutionality of arresting [the defendant] without regard for Idaho Code section
49-1407(1) was not argued before the district court, it is not properly before this Court on
appeal.” Id. at 276.
Soon after Garcia-Rodriguez, in Cohagan, the Idaho Supreme Court held, “To allow the
State to change positions on appeal . . . would sharply cut against our longstanding and recently
re-affirmed policy of requiring parties to present their arguments to the court below.” 162 Idaho
at 721. The State in Cohagan had conceded before the district court that the defendant had been
unlawfully seized, but on appeal argued that the stop was not illegal. Id.
Later, in Gonzalez, the Idaho Supreme Court reflected on Garcia-Rodriguez: “The State
in Garcia-Rodriguez shifted its position on the issue of whether the officers had probable cause
to arrest the defendant. Instead of arguing that the officers had probable cause to believe the
defendant would not appear, the State argued that the officers had probable cause to believe the
defendant did not have a driver’s license.” Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at ___, 439 P.3d at 1271. The
Gonzalez Court then emphasized, “We will not hold that a trial court erred in making a decision
on an issue or a party’s position on an issue that it did not have the opportunity to address.” Id.,
439 P.3d at 1271.
In Gonzalez itself, the Court decided the defendant had asked the district court for credit
for time served from the issuance of a warrant, but on appeal instead argued she was entitled to
credit for time served from the date of a hold, or from the date of service of an earlier warrant.
See id., 439 P.3d at 1271. The Gonzalez Court held, “These changes in position on the issue of
credit for time served were inappropriate.” Id., 439 P.3d at 1271. The Court reasoned that
allowing the defendant “to change positions on appeal would be unfair to the State because it did
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not have the opportunity to address and respond at the district court level,” and “it would be
inappropriate for this Court to rule that the district court erred by not considering evidence or
argument not presented to it.” Id. at ___, 439 P.3d at 1272. Additionally, the Court held: “Just
as we would not allow the State in Garcia-Rodriguez to change positions on an issue on appeal,
we will not allow Gonzalez to change positions on the issue of credit for time served. We hold
that she has failed to properly preserve her issue for appeal because of her transforming positions
on that issue.” Id., 439 P.3d at 1272.
Conversely, in Ada County Highway District v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138 (2017),
the Idaho Supreme Court held that the Ada County Highway District (ACHD) had properly
preserved an issue. The Court stated that, “early in the proceedings before the district court
ACHD adopted the position that damages caused during construction were not recoverable as
part of just compensation,” and “ACHD argued this position repeatedly, despite being
admonished numerous times by the district court to stop doing so.” Id. at 142 n.2. The Court
held: “There is no question that ACHD clearly raised the relevant issue before the district court.
ACHD’s specific arguments in support of its position may have evolved since the trial, but the
issues on appeal and ACHD’s position with respect to them remain the same.” Id.
Thus, in Brooke View it was proper “for this Court to consider ACHD’s arguments with
respect to the meaning of the word ‘construction’ . . . .” Id. In Gonzalez, the Court subsequently
clarified that a party’s “pragmatic evolutions” of the specific legal arguments used to support its
position “do not leave room for a party to raise new substantive issues on appeal or adopt a new
position on an issue that the trial court has not had the opportunity to rule on.” Gonzalez, 165
Idaho at ___, 439 P.3d at 1267.
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Here, the State on appeal has impermissibly adopted a new position on an issue that the
district court did not have the opportunity to rule on. The State consistently argued before the
district court that Mr. Hansen could not revoke his consent without a formal due process hearing.
(See R., pp.122-23; Tr., p.106, L.7 – p.114, L.11.)

The State’s current argument, that

Mr. Hansen could have revoked his consent but did not unequivocally do so, is nowhere to be
found in the State’s briefing or arguments before the district court.
In other words, the State has “shifted its position” on the issue of whether the consent
exception justified the warrantless search of Mr. Hansen’s car. See Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at ___,
439 P.3d at 1271. Instead of arguing Mr. Hansen could not revoke his previously-granted
consent absent a formal due process hearing, the State now argues Mr. Hansen could have
revoked his consent but did not unequivocally do so. (See R., pp.122-23; Tr., p.106, L.7 – p.114,
L.11; App. Br., pp.14-17.) But the Idaho Supreme Court has not held “that a trial court erred in
making a decision on an issue or a party’s position that it did not have the opportunity to
address,” and this Court should not accept the State’s invitation to do so in this case. See
Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at ___, 439 P.3d at 1271.
Allowing the State to change its position on the consent exception would sharply cut
against the longstanding policy of requiring parties to present their arguments to the district
courts. See Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721. Further, allowing the State to change positions on
appeal would be unfair to the defense, because Mr. Hansen did not have the opportunity to
respond to the no unequivocal revocation argument before the district court. See Gonzalez, 165
Idaho at ___, 439 P.3d at 1272. And as in Gonzalez, it would likewise “be inappropriate for this
Court to rule that the district court erred by not considering evidence or argument not presented
to it.” See id., 439 P.3d at 1272.
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This Court should decline to address the State's alternative argument that Mr. Hansen did
not unequivocally revoke his consent, because the State never took this position on the consent
exception before the district court.

See, e.g., Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 276.

Thus,

Mr. Hansen respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order granting his
motion to suppress.

4.

Even If Preserved, The No Unequivocal Revocation Of Consent Argument Does
Not Apply To Justify The Search Because The State Has Failed To Show That
The District Court's Factual Findings That Mr. Hansen Revoked His Consent Are
Clearly Erroneous

Even if the State preserved the argument, the no unequivocal revocation of consent
argument does not apply to justify the search of Mr. Hansen's car, because the State has failed to
show that the district court's factual findings that Mr. Hansen revoked his consent are
clearly erroneous.
When an appellate court reviews an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, the
appellate court accepts the trial court's factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous.

Munoz, 149 Idaho at 128. "Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by
substantial and competent evidence." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). "Substantial,
competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Moore, 164 Idaho at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Decisions regarding
the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to
be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810.
The State "has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily
given." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a
consent to search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of
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the circumstances. Id. at 227. When the basis for a search is consent, the government must limit
the scope of the search to that demarcated by the person giving consent, as measured under an
objective reasonableness standard. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250; Walter, 447 U.S. at 656.
“Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to
withdraw that consent.” State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646 (2014). “Idaho appellate courts
have typically analyzed revocation of consent using the same test that governs whether consent
was voluntary when initially granted.” State v. Greub, 162 Idaho 581, 586 (Ct. App. 2017). The
revocation or withdrawal of consent is part of the inquiry into the voluntariness of the consent
under the totality of the circumstances, and thus whether consent has been revoked or withdrawn
is a factual question. See, e.g., State v. Lutton, 161 Idaho 556, 561-62 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding
the district court’s factual findings, that the defendant did not revoke or withdraw his implied
consent and voluntarily consented to a blood draw, were supported by substantial evidence).
In this case, the district court made factual findings that Mr. Hansen revoked his consent.
The district court found, “When Defendant ultimately denied consent to search the vehicle, Sgt.
Sproat testified that he proceeded to search the vehicle based on the consent given pursuant to
Defendant’s conditions of probation.” (R., p.177.) Later, in its analysis, the court ruled that
Sergeant Sproat could not rely on Mr. Hansen’s Fourth Amendment waiver after he revoked his
consent to search. (See R., p.182.) The district court found, “The evidence in the record shows
that Defendant ultimately did not give consent for Sgt. Sproat to conduct a warrantless search of
his vehicle.” (R., p.185.) Further, the court distinguished this case from Gawron, “because
Defendant was present during the search and he expressly revoked his consent to search.”
(R., p.185.) In its conclusion, the district court ruled, “Sgt. Sproat’s search of Defendant’s
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vehicle was unlawful despite Defendant’s Fourth Amendment waiver because Defendant
expressly revoked his consent to search the vehicle.” (R., p.188.)
The State has not shown that the district court’s factual findings that Mr. Hansen revoked
his consent are clearly erroneous. In fact, the State does not expressly argue that the district
court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. (See App. Br., pp.4, 14-17.) Instead, the State
presents its own gloss on the facts. (See App. Br., pp.16-17.) According to the State, “Sgt.
Sproat asked [Mr.] Hansen whether he would consent to the search in order to evaluate his level
of cooperation with the probation terms, and to develop an independent justification for
searching the vehicle.” (App. Br., pp.16-17.) The State argues that Mr. Hansen “did not
expressly withdraw the probation consent or object to Sgt. Sproat’s search.

Instead, he

acknowledged Sgt. Sproat’s authority to search his vehicle pursuant to this previously given
Fourth Amendment waiver, but declined to consent independent of the probation agreement.”
(App. Br., p.17.) The State then contends that Mr. Hansen’s “refusal to provide consent and to
thus provide such cooperation or independent justification did not constitute an unequivocal
withdrawal of his previously given consent.” (App. Br., p.17.)
The State’s argument also improperly muddles the consent exception and the general
Fourth Amendment approach, by contending that, “Due to the Fourth Amendment waiver and
consent from [Mr.] Hansen’s probation agreement (as well as [Mr.] Hansen’s reduced
expectation of privacy), Sgt. Sproat was not required to obtain consent before searching
[Mr.] Hansen’s vehicle.” (App. Br., p.16.)
The State has failed to show that the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous.
The district court found that Sergeant Sproat asked in his exchange with Mr. Hansen, “So, you
give me consent? I just want to clarify.” (R., p.176.) Mr. Hansen ultimately replied, “Well, I
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mean then, no, I don’t.” (R., p.176.) The findings of fact show that Sergeant Sproat then
mentioned the Fourth Amendment waiver, and when Mr. Hansen asked, “Then isn’t that
consent,” the sergeant answered: “That’s not consent, okay? What I’m asking for is consent,
based on what I’m seeing here.” (R., pp.176-77.) Under the objective reasonableness standard,
the exchange thereby demonstrates, consistent with the district court’s findings, that Mr. Hansen
revoked his consent. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250; Greub, 162 Idaho at 586.
Thus, the district court’s factual findings that Mr. Hansen revoked his consent are
supported by substantial evidence. Despite the State’s gloss on the exchange between Sergeant
Sproat and Mr. Hansen, a reasonable mind would accept the exchange as evidence adequate to
support the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Hansen revoked his consent. See Moore, 164
Idaho at 381. Further, the district court was within its discretion to draw factual inferences from
the record. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. While the State may want this Court to draw different
factual inferences, the findings made by the district court are still supported by substantial
evidence. Thus, it cannot be said that the district court’s factual findings that Mr. Hansen
revoked his consent are clearly erroneous. See id.
Even if preserved, the State’s argument that Mr. Hansen did not unequivocally revoke his
consent does not apply to justify the search of Mr. Hansen’s car, because the State has not shown
that the district court’s factual findings that Mr. Hansen revoked his consent are clearly
erroneous. See Munoz, 149 Idaho at 128. To the contrary, the district court’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the search of Mr. Hansen’s car remains unlawful, and
the district court properly granted his motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Hansen respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district
court's order granting his motion to suppress.
DATED this 30th day of August, 2019.
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